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    The paper investigates the bank-lending channel (BLC) of monetary policy in South Africa 
using quarterly bank-level data for the period 2000Q1-2004Q4.  Capital adequacy and bank size 
are used as indicators for information problems faced by banks when they look for external 
finance.  Utilising dynamic panel estimation methods the study shows that BLC operates in South 
Africa.  The finding has some policy implications.  First, there is need to coordinate monetary 
policy with financial innovations and prudential banking regulations.  Second, the overall effects 
of monetary policy pursued by the South African Reserve Bank cannot be completely 
characterised by interest rates only.     
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    Monetary policy transmission mechanisms are the channels through which changes in 
monetary policy instruments generate the desired policy goals such as economic growth 
and price stability
1.  Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) highlight some difficulties faced in 
attempting to identify the transmission channels for monetary policy in emerging 
economies like South Africa.  First, emerging economies are subject to greater volatility 
and monetary policy regime changes.  Second, there is a dearth of empirical studies on 
emerging countries due to lack of data.  Finally, much of economic theory is conceived 
for industrial countries. 
 
    The Journal of Economic Perspectives fall 1995 edition contains papers presented in a 
symposium on monetary transmission mechanisms (Mishkin 1995, Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995, and Taylor, 1995).  Mishkin (1995) identifies four channels of monetary policy 
transmission; interest rate channel, credit channel (balance-sheet and bank-lending 
channel), the exchange rate channel and other asset prices channel.   The study focuses on 
the bank-lending channel (BLC).   
 
        Kashyap and Stein (1993) argues that under the lending view of monetary 
transmission, there are three assets; money, publicly issued bonds and intermediated 
loans.  Under this view, the banks play two roles.  They create money and make loans 
(maturity transformation), which unlike buying bonds the household sector cannot 
                                                 
1 The other objectives are full-employment, international competitiveness and financial stability. 
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perform.  Specifically, banks are suited to handle certain types of borrowers with high 
asymmetric information problems e.g. small firms.   
 
    In the three-asset world, monetary policy can affect investment not only through its 
effect on interest rates but also via its impact on the supply of bank loans.  Some banks 
may, however, insulate their loan portfolio from the tight monetary policy by resorting to 
non-traditional sources of finance.  Thus the decrease in bank loans is likely to differ 
among banks.    
 
   There is abundant evidence on the empirical relationship between monetary policy, 
bank loans and economic activity (Kashyap and Stein, 2000, Kishan and Opiela, 2000, 
Huang, 2003, Sevestre, Savignac and Loupias, 2002).  The general conclusion in most of 
the studies is that tight monetary policy leads to a drop in bank credit, which has large 
negative impact on economic activity. 
 
    The  study  employs  dynamic  panel  data  approach to test how bank characteristics 
(capital adequacy and bank assets) in South Africa affect the response of loan supply 
after a change in monetary policy.  The principal finding is that the BLC operates in 
South Africa.  
 
    The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews monetary 
policy in South Africa.  Section 3 specifies the model.  Section 4 deals with estimation 
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issues while Section 5 reports the results.  The main insights and policy recommendations 
are presented in Section 6. 
   




    According to Mohr et al. (2004:373), monetary policy in South Africa can be divided 
into five regimes; Liquid-asset based system, mixed system, cost of cash reserves based 
system with monetary targeting, repurchase agreement (repo) system with monetary 
targeting and informal inflation targeting, and repo system with formal inflation 
targeting.  These regimes are presented in Table 1.  The focus of the study is on the last 
regime, which uses the repo rate and formal inflation targets. 
 
    Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of the channels that are likely to be involved 
in the monetary transmission mechanism in South Africa.  Using the current monetary 
policy regime (last row in Table 1), there are a number of steps in the monetary policy 
transmission process.    
 
    First, a change in the repurchase agreement rate (repo) by the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) affects the market interest rates (rates for deposits and lending), asset 
prices, expectations and nominal exchange rates. 
  
Table 1 
Monetary policy regimes in South Africa 
Policy regime  Period  Features 
     5
Liquid asset-based system  1960-1980  Quantitative controls on interest rates and credit 
Mixed system (Liquid asset-
based system and cost of cash 
reserves-based system) 
1981-1985  Liquid asset-based system gradually replaced by cost 
of cash reserves-based system. Banks held a certain 
percentage of their liabilities in form of cash reserves 
with the SARB.  The reserves did not earn interest and 
could be obtained by discounting eligible financial 
instruments at the SARB’s discount rate. Cost of 
credit to the general public was linked to the SARB’s 
discount rate. 
Cost of cash reserves-based 
system with monetary 
targeting 
1986-1998  Pre-announced targets of money supply (M3) pursued 
indirectly through changes in the SARB’s bank rate.  
Monetary targets missed due to, among others, 
financial liberalisation and other structural changes in 
the economy.   
Repurchase agreement 
(Repo) system, M3 targets 
and informal targets for core 
inflation
2  
1998-1999  Repo system coupled with pre-announced targets of 
money supply (M3) and Informal Targets of core 
inflation 
Repo system with formal 




Main instrument used is the repo rate, which is the 
interest rate that the SARB charges for 
accommodating the cash needs of commercial banks.  
A monetary policy committee (MPC) of the SARB 
meets regularly to consider possible adjustments to the 
repo rate. 
 
Source: Adapted from Mohr et al.(2004:373) 
 
         
    Second, changes in these variables lead to changes in consumption (C) and investment 
(I) through their impact on the components of the domestic demand and net external 
demand (exports and imports).    
 
                                                 
2 Excludes the prices of fresh and frozen meat and fish; fresh and frozen vegetables; interest rates on 
mortgage bonds and overdrafts/personal loans; value added tax (VAT); assessment rates by local 
government. 
3 Excludes interest rates on mortgage bonds. 
     6
Repo interest rate
Market interest rates Nominal 
exchange rate
Expectations/confidence Other asset prices 
(equity,land,property)









Source: Adapted from HM Treasury (2003:10) and Smal and Jager (2001:5) 
Figure 1. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
 
    There are four different routes through which monetary policy-induced changes in 
market interest rates, asset prices, exchange rates and expectations could affect the 
components of aggregate demand.  These are the interest rate channel; the credit channel 
(bank-lending and balance-sheet channels); exchange rate channel and other asset prices 
channel. 
    In accordance with Mishkin (1995) the BLC in South Africa can be schematically 
presented as follows; 
↓ ↓ ↓⇒ ↓⇒ ↓ ↑⇒ P Y C I loans bank deposits bank rate po , , , Re                (1) 
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    Equation 1 states that an increase in the repo rate by the SARB curbs bank deposits 
and demand for loans to finance investment and consumption.  Depending on the 
elasticity of aggregate supply and demand, national income or prices may fall.    
 
    One implication of the BLC is that monetary policy has greater effects on small banks, 
which cannot cushion themselves against tight monetary policy.   It also underscores the 
fact that if prudential regulations allow banks greater ability to raise non-reservable funds 
(e.g.CD), the potency of monetary policy is impaired. 
 
    The focus of this paper is on the BLC.  However, there are some points that should be 
emphasized.  First, as pointed out by Mohr et al. (2004: 523), the link between the 
interest rate and investment spending is quite crucial for the BLC.  Second, the 
transmission mechanisms works through various channels and it is not easy to isolate one 
of them.  Third, the outcome of the process is quite uncertain in most cases.  Finally, 
there is always a time lag between the policy action and its eventual impact on the real 
output (Y) and price level (P).  
 
3. Model specification 
 
    The study uses an empirical specification based on Kashyap and Stein (1993); 
     8
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      refers to either total stock of gross loans, total deposits or non-deposit sources of 
funds for bank i at quarter t and.   is real GDP to control for demand-side shocks in the 




    A prerequisite for a proper test of the BLC is a good indicator of monetary policy in 
South Africa ( ).  As pointed out by Kashyap and Stein (2000), there is a lot of 
controversy on this issue.  The possible indicators of monetary policy are the change in 
short term interest rate under the control of the central bank, the residuals from a vector 
autoregression (VAR) representing the reaction function of the central bank (Bernanke 
and Mihov, 1998), the narrative approach (Boschen and Mills, 1995).   In this paper the 
repo rate is used as the indicator of monetary policy in South Africa in the period 2000 to 
2004 (Table 1). 
t i
 
    The   represents the ith commercial bank while t captures the tth quarter i.e. 
.   The error term is decomposed as a one-way error component 
model (i.e.
i
4 2004 ,..., 1 2000 Q Q t =
it i it u ν µ + = ).  The first component,  i µ , captures the bank specific-effect and 
takes the form of a bank individual constant.  This term encompasses the effect of all 
explanatory variables such as credit assessment and monitoring skills that differs across 
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banks but remains constant over time.  it ν  is an idiosyncratic remainder error term 
assumed to be white noise.  Centred quarterly dummy variables for quarters 1 to 3 are 
also included.  These dummy variables take values of 0.75 and –0.25 otherwise. 
 
    A bank’s loan supply reaction to monetary policy is assumed to depend linearly on the 
bank’s balance sheet strength (bank characteristics i.e.  ), which can be proxied by 
bank size ( ) and capitalisation ( ).   Bank size and capitalisation are measures of 
bank’s health that affect the external finance premium.  These measures are defined as 
follows; 
it X
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    Where   and   are total assets and capital, respectively.   Equations 3 and 4 show 
the normalisation of the bank characteristics with respect to their average across all the 
banks with a view to computing indicators that sum to zero over all observations.  The 
average of the interaction term   is therefore zero and hence the parameters 
it A it C
it t X i * ) 5 ( k + β  
in Equation 2 are interpretable as the overall monetary policy effect on the variable being 
explained (loans, deposits or non-deposit funding related liabilities).  
 
    A dynamic panel data model is used for two reasons.  First, there is a close banker-
customer relationship that develops and may create lock-in effects thus making it costly 
     10
for the borrower to change a bank (Rajan, 1992).  Thus lagged loans affect current loans.  
Second, monetary policy only impacts lending behaviour with a lag due to contractual 
commitments (e.g. floating and fixed charges on movable and immovable assets, 
respectively).   Hence, lagged values of the explanatory variables also affect current loans 
with a lag. 
 
4. Estimation framework 
 
    The dynamic nature of the model in Equation 2 facilitates a better understanding of the 
dynamics of loan adjustment.    However, as pointed out by Baltagi (2001), the dynamic 
panel data regression in Equation 2 is characterised by two sources of persistence over 
time; autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors and bank-specific effects characterising the heterogeneity among the 
commercial banks.   
 
    The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable renders the OLS estimator biased and 
inconsistent even if the remainder error term ( it ν ) is not serially correlated.   Nickell 
(1981) shows that the within estimator will be biased of order  ( )
1 − T O  and its consistency 
depends on T being large.  One prominent way to address the problem faced in dynamic 
panel data has been through the first-differenced generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimator as suggested by Arrellano and Bond (1991). 
 
    Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  and  Kruiniger  (2000) highlight some pitfalls of first 
differenced GMM (Arrellano and Bond, 1991) estimator when using persistent data or 
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close to random walk.  The main problem is that the instruments used in the standard 
first-differenced GMM estimator become less informative in two cases.  First, as  1 β  in 
Equation 2 increases to unity, and second as the relative variance of the fixed effects 
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    Arrellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate that when 
1 1 = β  the instruments used in first differenced GMM estimators are no longer correlated 
with the first differences of the regressors.  Additionally, some moment conditions 
become discontinuous at  1 1 = β  (Kruiniger, 2000). 
 
    The alternative approach is the Arrellano and Bover (1995) systems estimator, which 
exploits an assumption about the initial conditions processes to obtain additional linear 
moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series
4.  This method 
transforms the data using orthogonal forward deviation (Equation 25 in Arrellano and 
Bover, 1995).  This transformation subtracts the mean of the remaining future 
observations available in the sample from each of the forward (T-1) observations. 
 
        This transformation has a number of important characteristics.  First, it eliminates 
bank-specific effects and keeps the orthogonality among the transformed errors.   Second, 
since the rows of the transformation matrix add up to zero, the permanent effects are 
eliminated. Finally, the transformation matrix is upper triangular so that lags of 
                                                 
4 Most variables in this study are persistent  (Table 6 in the appendix). 
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predetermined variables are valid instruments in the transformed equations.  Blundell and 
Bond (1998) demonstrate that the systems estimator results in substantial efficiency gains 
and reduced bias, particularly with persistent data. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
    The study uses a sample of 24 banks out of 38 in existences as at December 2004.   
The selection of the estimation period (2000Q1 to 2004Q4) is predicated on the need to 
test BLC within one single monetary policy regime in South Africa (repo system and 
inflation targeting in Table 1).  Capitalisation adequacy and bank size are used to 
discriminate banks according to their external finance costs.  
 
    There are two conditions for the BLC to work in South Africa.  First, there should be 
bank-dependent customers in South Africa.  Second, monetary policy by the SARB 
should be able to affect the supply of loans so that the decrease in loan supply depresses 
real aggregate spending in South Africa.  The first condition generally holds in South 
Africa in the formal economy.  Therefore the focus is on testing the second condition.    
The study begins by first testing the prerequisite conditions for the SARB to be able to 
affect loan supply. 
5.1 The effect of monetary policy on deposit mobilisation 
 
    The first question that needs to be answered is do banks in South Africa experience a 
fall in deposits following a monetary contraction?  Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 present 
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the results for the effect of monetary policy on bank deposits using capital adequacy and 
bank size to discriminate banks. The Sargan over-identifying restriction confirms the 
validity of lagged levels dated t-3 to t-5 as instruments.   
 
        First, the results show that an increase in the repo rate significantly reduces bank 
deposits in South Africa (Equation 1).  Thus tight monetary policy is inimical to the 
deposit mobilisation function of commercial banks in South Africa. 
 
    Second, bank deposits increase by 1.8 per cent following 1 per cent increase in real 
GDP.  This is consistent with expectation since a booming economy would tend to have 
many economic agents with excess savings, which commercial banks can mobilise. 
 
    Third, the effect of bank characteristics on deposits differs.  On one hand an increase in 
bank capital-asset ratio beyond the banking industry-wide average (Equation 4) leads to a 
reduction in deposits.  This finding is expected given the fact that banks with high capital 
asset-ratio have less deposits (Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix).  On the other hand an 
increase in bank size (Equation 3) leads to an increase in deposits.  This is a confirmation 
of the fact that large banks have large deposits (Tables 4 and 5). 
 
    Finally, the joint effects of the repo rate and bank characteristics (capital-asset ratio 
and bank size) are insignificant implying that the level of deposits falls uniformly 
regardless of differences in balance sheet strength (information asymmetry).  Thus, in 
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general deposits tend to fall following tight monetary policy, which satisfies one of the 
conditions of BLC. 
 
5.2 The effect of monetary policy on non-deposit sources of finance 
 
    The second question is can banks in South Africa replace the tight monetary policy-
induced lose in deposits by other sources of funds?   To answer this question the non-
deposit funding related liabilities from the private sector is used to proxy other sources of 
funds.  Columns 4 and 7 of Table 2 present the results that attempt to answer this 
question.  The Sargan over-identifying restriction confirms the validity of lagged levels 
dated t-3 to t-5 as instruments.   
 
    First, using capitalisation, an increase in the repo rate has a significant negative effect 
on non-deposit funding related liabilities.  However, using bank size the repo rate has no 
effect on non-deposit funding related liabilities.     
 
    Second, an increase in real GDP leads to a reduction in non-deposit funding related 
liabilities.  This can be rationalised by the fact that robust economic activity is associated 
with high deposits implying reduced need to seek other sources of finance. 
 
Third, banks, which are highly capitalised, seek less non-deposit funding related 
liabilities from the private sector.  However, large banks tend to seek more non-deposit 
funding related liabilities. 
   Table 2  
Orthogonal forward deviation transformation GMM estimation results 
 
  Capital adequacy Bank size 
  Loans    Deposits  Other funding 
liabilities 
Loans Deposits  Other funding liabilities 
Loans (-1)  0.934*** 
(27.699) 
         0.811***
(23.350) 
Deposits(-1)       
      
  
    
   
   
   























































































  Diagnostic statistics 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.549            0.415 0.048 0.58 0.615 0.118
Instrument rank                 25.000 24.000 24.000 24.000 24.000 24.000
Sargan J statistic  23.472(0.217)  19.886(0.225)  16.821(0.397)  21.789(0.295)  20.920(0.182)  18.621(0.289) 
Notes:     (i)  *, ** and *** are 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. (ii) Instrumentation: Lagged dependent variable dated  3 − t  to  5 − t        Finally, the joint effects of contractionary monetary policy and bank characteristics 
differ.  On one hand capital-asset ratio is insignificant implying that the level of non-
deposits funding related liabilities falls uniformly regardless of differences in capital 
(information asymmetry). On the other hand contractionary monetary policy leads to 
increased levels of non-deposit funding related liabilities.  Thus the reserve bank is 
unable to effectively control the non-deposit funding related liabilities from the public.   
 
5.3 The effect of monetary policy on bank loans 
 
    Having confirmed the conditions for BLC, the actual test is performed in the columns 
2 and 5 of Table 2.   BLC exists if the coefficients associated with the joint effects of the 
repo rate and bank characteristics are positive.  A non-significant coefficient may indicate 
either absence of BLC or that the chosen bank characteristic does not appropriately 
discriminate banks in South Africa according to their external finance cost. 
 
    First, the coefficient for the repo is significantly negative, which is consistent with the 
interest rate channel and shows that bank loan supply falls as monetary policy tightens 
and vice versa. 
 
    Second, there is a negative relationship between real GDP and bank loans.  This is 
inconsistent with expectation implying that banks tend to lean against the tide.  Thus 
recessions are characterised by banks trying to lend so as to prop up businesses and vice 
versa.   17
    Third, the partial effect of bank characteristics is ambiguous.  Capital-asset ratio has a 
significant negative effect on bank loans while bank size has a significant positive effect.  
This is not surprising given the descriptive statistics in Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix 
where it is apparent that small banks tend to have high capital-asset ratio. 
 
     Fourth, the joint effect of monetary policy and bank characteristics is significantly 
positive implying that banks with strong balance sheets in terms of capital-asset ratio and 
total assets can cushion the effects of tight monetary policy on their loan portfolio.  This 
effectively confirms the presence of BLC in South Africa.   This finding is consistent 
results from the US (e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 2000, Kishan and Opiela, 2000), who find 




    The aim of the paper was to check the existence of BLC in South Africa over the 
period 2000Q1 to 2004Q4.  This period was selected on account of same monetary 
policy regime (i.e. inflation targeting and repo system).  The study employs capital 
adequacy and bank size to discriminate banks.  The Arrellano and Bover (1995) 
estimation framework is used since it is robust to persistent data. 
 
    Using both bank size and capital-asset ratio the study finds that BLC operates in South 
Africa.  The finding of BLC has a number of implications (Kashyap and Stein (1993).  
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First, monetary policy has distributional consequences in the banking sector.   
Specifically, the cost of tight monetary policy might fall more on small banks and their 
customers. These distributional considerations may be important when formulating 
monetary policy in South Africa. 
 
      Second, the fact that large banks in South Africa can cushion the effects of tight 
monetary policy on their loan portfolio implies that financial innovations and prudential 
bank regulations can affect the potency of monetary policy.  Thus there is need to co-
ordinate of prudential bank regulation, financial innovations and monetary policy.   
Increase in the size of banks in South Africa may drive a wedge between monetary 
policy conducted by SARB and the banking system.  This policy recommendation has 
implication for the deal between ABSA Bank and Barclays bank (Table A.1)
5.  The 
resultant banking conglomerate may use its huge capital base to cushion the effects of 
tight monetary policy.   
  
   Finally, using the repo rate as a measure of cost of financing may give a misleading 






                                                 
5 Barclays bank Plc is to invest 33 billion rands in Absa bank. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Description of variables  
 
Capital and reserves: Net qualifying capital and reserve funds and Non-qualifying capital 
and reserve funds including impairments. 
 
Total assets:  Central bank money and gold; investments including trading portfolio 
assets; non-financial assets and other assets. 
 
Loans: Other private sector loans and advances; foreign currency loans and advances.  
Specific and general provisions for bad and doubtful debts are included. 
 
Deposits: Deposits denominated in rands and deposits denominated in foreign currency. 
 
Total funding related liabilities: loans and advances given to the bank including repo 
payments; other liabilities to the public. 
 
The individual bank variables are collected from Banks’ D1900 Returns at the SARB 
(http://www.reservebank.co.za ). 
 
Real GDP (2000=100), CPI (2000=100) and repo rate are collected from historical data 
download facility at the the SARB (http://www.reservebank.co.za ) 
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A2. Descriptive analysis  
 
Table 4 
Basic bank characteristics (Average during 2000Q1-2004Q4) 





















ABN Amro Bank 293.3 5220.2 4420.1 403.0 5.8 4054.9
ABSA Bank 15018.0 192857.4 146018.6 17084.5 7.7 46271.4
African Bank 1755.4 5638.0 1070.7 2556.8 31.2 4664.5
Albaraka Bank 47.1 567.0 490.3 16.0 8.3 86.4
Barclays Bank 149.3 5138.1 3623.3 895.4 2.9 2795.2
Bank of Baroda 58.7 145.7 13.9 74.2 41.2 103.5
Bank of Taiwan 78.7 866.2 667.5 110.9 10.0 819.9
Calyon Bank 256.8 10755.8 9521.9 375.1 2.6 5975.8
Citi Bank 834.5 20641.1 16658.2 280.8 4.3 11250.6
Commerzbank 
Aktiengesellschaft 353.8 4288.1 2753.3 906.0 8.3 3575.8
First Rand Bank 11578.4 171053.3 114341.3 22617.3 6.7 45223.1
GBS Mutual Bank 29.1 275.6 238.2 0.0 10.4 7.2
Habib Overseas Bank 13.7 195.8 169.0 7.5 7.1 82.0
HBZ Bank 52.0 375.6 306.1 4.3 15.2 145.7
Imperial Bank 912.4 7449.0 6055.8 27.5 13.4 374.3
Investec Bank 8373.3 56663.3 7650.3 34625.6 14.7 23046.9
Marriot Merchant Bank 103.8 548.8 427.6 0.0 19.0 141.9
MEEG Bank 65.6 575.6 492.5 5.7 11.8 145.9
Mercantile Bank 295.2 2648.6 2086.1 140.6 10.5 1305.3
NEDCOR Bank 14581.1 162926.6 119689.9 10087.8 8.9 49038.6
SA Bank of Athens 51.8 411.7 338.0 12.7 12.6 230.0
Societe Generale 
Johannesburg 86.7 1569.2 1306.4 88.1 7.2 653.5
Standard Bank 14686.5 202347.5 135730.7 19238.3 7.6 56970.0
VBS Mutual Bank 23.1 158.2 132.2 3.0 14.8 9.4
 
S
Notes: All the variables are in real million rands  
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Table 5 
Correlation between important bank variables 
.3 Panel unit root test 
 
 root in panel data emanates from the fact that a regression 
equation with integrated variables is likely to be spurious (unless there is cointegration).   
Panel-based unit root tests have higher power than unit root tests based on individual time 
series. 
 
The test for panel unit roots can be classified into two groups.  The first class of tests 
assume that the autoregressive parameters are common across banks.  The Levin, Lin, 
and Chu (2002) and Hadri (2000) tests employ this assumption.  The first tests employ a 
null hypothesis of a unit root while the last test uses a null of no unit root. 
 
The second class of tests allows the autoregressive parameter to vary across the cross-
sections (banks). The Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), among others employ this 
assumption.  
Capital & 








Capital & Reserves 1.00
Total assets 0.98 1.00
Total deposits 0.95 0.99 1.00
Non-deposit funding 
related liabilities 0.81 0.74 0.63 1.00
% Capital-asset ratio -0.16 -0.22 -0.24 -0.09 1.00




The need to test for unit
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Table 6 
Panel unit root tests  
Variable  LLC statistic  IPS w-stat  Hadri z- test 




















Real non-deposit funding related liabilities   
Real capital adequacy 



















d ***  denotes rejection of n 5%  an cance pectively. 
(ii) Sample: 24 banks, 2000Q1- 2004Q
ll equations use individual effect ividual tr




(i)* , ** an ull at 10%,  d 1% signifi  levels, res
4 
(iii) A s and ind ends 
PS-Im, Pe d Shin (2 dri-Hadri (20
(v) p-values in parentheses 
 
ts show that the variables are non-stationary. 
   